Friday, January 27, 2012

Marx condemns the false god of money

Copied and abridged from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/power.htm

“Six stallions, say, I can afford,
Is not their strength my property?
I tear along, a sporting lord,
As if their legs belonged to me.”

- Goethe: Faust (Mephistopheles)

Shakespeare in Timon of Athens:

“Gold? Yellow, glittering, precious gold?
... Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides,
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads:
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions, bless the accursed;
Make the hoar leprosy adored, place thieves
And give them title, knee and approbation
With senators on the bench: This is it
That makes the wappen’d widow wed again;
She, whom the spital-house and ulcerous sores
Would cast the gorge at, this embalms and spices
To the April day again. Come, damned earth,
Thou common whore of mankind, that put’st odds
Among the rout of nations.”

And also later:

Thou visible God!
That solder’st close impossibilities,
And makest them kiss!

Shakespeare excellently depicts the real nature of money. To understand him, let us begin, first of all, by expounding the passage from Goethe.

That which is for me through the medium of money – that for which I can pay (i.e., which money can buy) – that am I myself, the possessor of the money. The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money’s properties are my – the possessor’s – properties and essential powers. What I am and can do is, therefore, not at all determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the effect of ugliness – its deterrent power – is nullified by money. I, according to my individual characteristics, am lame, but money furnishes me with twenty-four feet. Therefore I am not lame. I am bad, dishonest, unscrupulous, stupid; but money is honoured, and hence its possessor. Money is the supreme good, therefore its possessor is good. Money, besides, saves me the trouble of being dishonest: I am therefore presumed honest. I am brainless, but money is the real brain of all things and how then should its possessor be brainless? Besides, he can buy clever people for himself, and is he who has power over the clever not more clever than the clever? Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the human heart longs for, possess all human capacities? Does not my money, therefore, transform all my incapacities into their contrary?

...

Shakespeare stresses especially two properties of money:

1. It is the visible divinity – the transformation of all human and natural properties into their contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things: impossibilities are soldered together by it.

2. It is the common whore, the common procurer of people and nations.

The distorting and confounding of all human and natural qualities, the fraternisation of impossibilities – the divine power of money – lies in its character as men’s estranged, alienating and self-disposing species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind.

That which I am unable to do as a man, and of which therefore all my individual essential powers are incapable, I am able to do by means of money. Money thus turns each of these powers into something which in itself it is not – turns it, that is, into its contrary.

If I long for a particular dish or want to take the mail-coach because I am not strong enough to go by foot, money fetches me the dish and the mail-coach: that is, it converts my wishes from something in the realm of imagination, translates them from their meditated, imagined or desired existence into their sensuous, actual existence – from imagination to life, from imagined being into real being. In effecting this mediation, [money] is the truly creative power.

No doubt the demand also exists for him who has no money, but his demand is a mere thing of the imagination without effect or existence for me, for a third party, for the [others],||XLIII| and which therefore remains even for me unreal and without object.

...

Since money, as the existing and active concept of value, confounds and confuses all things, it is the general confounding and confusing of all things – the world upside-down – the confounding and confusing of all natural and human qualities.

He who can buy bravery is brave, though he be a coward. As money is not exchanged for any one specific quality, for any one specific thing, or for any particular human essential power, but for the entire objective world of man and nature, from the standpoint of its possessor it therefore serves to exchange every quality for every other, even contradictory, quality and object: it is the fraternisation of impossibilities. It makes contradictions embrace.

Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc. If you want to enjoy art, you must be an artistically cultivated person; if you want to exercise influence over other people, you must be a person with a stimulating and encouraging effect on other people. Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return – that is, if your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you do not make yourself a beloved one, then your love is impotent – a misfortune.

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Correcting Sexism in Jung

Carl Jung's terminology provides a powerful tool for analyzing the complexities of the mind. His basic goal is to show that God, while not consciously experienced by everyone, is an empirical psychological fact of the psyche. I believe he succeeds brilliantly in this. However, his beliefs are not without error. Jung believed that humanity could never be free from the false gods of "dominating ideas." He sees these dominating ideas as being universal to the human condition.
Man has always and everywhere been under the influence of dominating ideas. Any one who alleges that he is not can immediately be suspected of having exchanged a known form of belief for a variant which is less known both to himself and to others. Instead of theism he is a devotee of atheism, instead of Dionysus he favours the more modern Mithras, and instead of heaven he seeks paradise on earth. - http://www.jungland.ru/Library/EngArchAnim.htm
Jung failed to see the simple Marxist truth that class society is the source of the same "dominating ideas" he assumes to be universally embedded in the human psyche. He was writing during Stalin's rule of the USSR, and it is likely that a number of his patients clung to the false hope of Soviet communism. As a result, Jung may not have made a thorough reading of Marx. From Jung's assumption that dominating ideas dictate humanity's fate, it follows that Jung would color these "dominating ideas" as male and female, because gender is the most fundamental and most pervasive class division.

His sexism comes out when he describes psychological tendencies that characterize each gender. In the following passage, "anima" refers to the "feminine" soul of men, while "animus" refers to the "masculine" soul of women:
Turned towards the world, the anima is fickle, capricious, moody, uncontrolled and emotional, sometimes gifted with daemonic intuitions, ruthless, malicious, untruthful, bitchy, double-faced, and mystical. The animus is obstinate, harping on principles, laying down the law, dogmatic, world-reforming, theoretic, word-mongering, argumentative, and domineering. Both alike have bad taste: the anima surrounds herself with inferior people, and the animus lets himself be taken in by second-rate thinking.["Concerning Rebirth," CW 9i, pars. 222f.]
Note that the anima / animus distinction is often quite useful. Class society reinforces gender roles, which then repress the opposite traits, where in Jung's conception, they are encompassed in the individual's soul or shadow. Jung's mistake is that he believes the male and female traits are universally true, rather than reflecting specific conditions within society.

An online essay - http://libcom.org/library/critique-new-atheists - describes Jung's mistake regarding a better society:
Jung remained convinced that there was a higher self and that humans were capable of attaining to it: his theory of ‘individuation’ aimed at precisely this outcome. However he won this optimism lightly; he managed to posit the existence of a higher self in part by under-estimating the scale of the problem... He simply could not envisage how a fundamentally different society could emerge nor the extent to which the social forms hitherto (in particular social forms based on class division and exploitation) were premised precisely on the need to ‘repress’ and keep the full attainment of life out of reach for the majority of the population.
This error does not affect the bulk of Jungian theory, however! The theory requires only one small adjustment of moving the gendered aspects of the soul to the INDIVIDUAL unconscious, rather than the collective unconscious, where Jung had placed them. Note that the soul remains in the collective unconscious; it is just the soul's gendered traits that should be placed in the individual level of psyche, rather than the collective level.
________________________________________________________________
4/6/2012 update:
I was wrong about "moving the gendered aspects of the soul to the individual unconscious." I went in the wrong direction. The archetype of the Self, or "God-image", is the ungendered part of the soul. I just didn't see this earlier. So the soul for Jung is ungendered once you go deep enough, but we just don't usually experience it that way, because nearest to the surface of the dividing line between conscious and unconscious, the soul is still "mixed" with the effects of our gender.

Monday, December 26, 2011


“Do we care about each other?”

Pink Floyd’s album Animals asks us to consider the consequences of our answer, claiming that it is empathy above all else, that differentiates human behavior from the behavior of other animals. Without empathy, we behave no differently than pigs, dogs, or sheep, vacuously zig zagging through life, hoarding, obeying, or being led astray.

Animals are actually capable of empathy, but their caring is limited by their lack of language and culture. When society accepts greed as a desirable principle, our caring becomes limited by a lack of opportunity to express it. We start to believe in “market solutions” more than in our ability to productively communicate, resulting in the fictions that someone must “hit bottom” in order to choose to quit an addiction, that economic profit is the driving motivation behind scientific progress, and that the poor are somehow responsible for the economic difficulties they face.

With the loss of empathy, we also lose our ability to openly communicate the struggles we face. As a species, we backslide.

“If you didn’t care / what happens to me,and I didn’t care / for you,we would zig zag our way, through the boredom and pain,occasionally glancing up through the rain...And watching / for pigs on the wing”

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Michael Albert and Alan Maas debate the relevance Marxism


Okay, went through the Maas-Albert debate on Marxism. Tried to pick out some highlights below. To summarize, Albert argues against democratic centralism claiming that it is one sign of what he calls "coordinatorism" and was one of the factors that enabled Stalin to come to power.

I'm not sure if this necessarily connects to the Maas-Albert debate, but while I was going through that, I also did some thinking about the role of radical-left groups within Occupy. I see Occupy as a broad coalition, not just of radical groups, but of everyone who recognizes the current two-party political system is worthless. Occupy is invaluable in that it provides a rational structure, with which people can identify and attach their politics to, but as I see it, being a coalition limits what kind of artistic statements Occupy can make.

A coalition is based on a common subset of rational principles, with which all members can agree. Artistic statements are often subjective, and so could easily fall outside that subset. For instance, I would feel out-of-place proposing in the GA, "Occupy needs to make a short narrative film that illustrates the inherent savagery within capitalism." The advantage that ideological groups have is that ideological groups are based on a complete framework of rational principles, out of which subjective, artistic appeals can be created.

So that's how I see the role of radical groups within the Occupy movement: ideological groups should create appeals to people on the artistic, intuitive-ideological level.

Anyway, back to the debate, Albert's accusation "Marxism leads to coordinatorism" is perhaps one-sided in that coordinatorism is just one possible outcome of a successful Marxist-Leninist revolution, and hopefully not the odds-on outcome. I have to agree with Albert that the possibility is there.

Albert explains "coordinatorism"

I say that class exists due to ownership, yes, but also due to social relations of the division of labor. Some [labor] have positions that empower, others have positions that deaden. This differential can lead to class division. To pay attention to those who exist between labor and capital by saying they have some capitalistic attributes and some workeristic attributes, whatever combination and variation may be discussed, is precisely still seeing everything in terms of these two categories and not introducing a third.

The situation of those who monopolize empowering work and the levers of daily economic decision making power isn't just confused. This group between labor and capital isn't just the bottom of capitalists above merging into the top of workers below. It has its own position, its own definition, and as a result its own views and interests. Calling it the petty bourgeoisie is again just working in terms of the old ownership viewpoint...and paying attention to the wrong sector of people...they own a little but not a lot of capital. The point is to see that something other than ownership differences can be the source of class division and even class rule.

When you say that Marx insightfully noted that capitalists had to elevate a sector to a considerable degree of power, I say, yes, Marx himself understood a whole lot of things, and if this is one, that's good. But the richer understanding isn't embedded in the system that is called Marxism. If people who read a useful take on such matters from Marx or whoever else come to realize that it is possible for the situation in workplaces to demarcate a new class due to the distribution of empowering and disempowering tasks such that some people monopolize the former and the rest endure the latter, that'll be excellent.

Instead, Albert argues for councils:

There are some Marxists, they have been called council communists [a position associated with libertarian socialism], who tried to describe a truly socialist -- in the positive sense -- vision. I feel they just didn't get very far, though others might feel that is too dismissive. But they are the exception that proves the rule, in my view. They ought to be extolled as the best Marxism has had to offer. Instead, they are literally ignored, to my knowledge, by large Marxist parties the world round.

Maas explains how the early soviets functioned:

The soviets first appeared as workplace committees organized for a wave of battles over economic issues. But the need to respond to wider political questions--most obviously, the use of massive repression by the Tsar--led the councils to make links locally and then regionally. As Lenin described it, "Soviets of Workers Deputies are organs of direct mass struggle. They originated as organs of the strike struggle. By force of circumstance, they very quickly became the organs of general revolutionary struggle against the government. The course of events and the transition from a strike to an uprising irresistibly transformed them into organs of an uprising."

Here was the form, Lenin and the other revolutionary socialists of Russia recognized, through which workers could exercise power democratically. There was a direct connection between the economic power of workers and a new political system based on representation from the factory floor. The level of grassroots participation was obvious from the ratio of delegates to those they represented: one delegate for every 500 workers. And like the Paris Commune, delegates were immediately recallable and paid no more than an average workers’ wage.

Much of the argument centers around the term "state capitalism." Maas believes the term applies to the Soviet economy under Stalin, and also certain aspects of Western capitalist economies. Albert says that it is not useful to call the Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese economies "state capitalist" economies when there are no private owners of capital. Maas replies:

"Once you strip away the rhetoric, you’re left with the picture of a society dominated by a minority ruling class that controls the means of production--not through private ownership, but through the apparatus of the state. This ruling class, like its counterparts in Western-style capitalism, organizes production to meet the demands of competition--not the economic competition of individual capitals fighting to dominate the market, but the military competition of state capitals fighting for political survival. As under capitalism in the West, the primary goal is not the accumulation of private wealth (though this is certainly a goal!), but the accumulation of greater and greater means of production--in Stalinist Russia’s case, machinery and factories that could be devoted to military production.

Albert says it's more important to focus on how these countries arrived at this end picture:

You say "If Albert thinks a debate with me and the ISO about the relevance of Marxism is useful, then he should address himself to our Marxism--not the fake Marxism of bureaucrats and dictators that we have always rejected and opposed." I think I am speaking to the core views of Marxism, period. I think our disagreements indicate that. You wouldn't let an advocate of capitalism say don't talk to me about depressions, about starvation, about wars and colonization -- that's just bad capitalism, I am for good capitalism... Does the ISO utilize democratic centralism? If not, okay, I will take a closer look. But if so, that would be a big indicator for me...consistent, in my view, with coordinator dominance. But it could be that in addition the ISO has beliefs in many domains I would like and support, I don't know.

Maas and Albert also go back and forth about coordinatorism, and whether it does in fact represent a separate possibility from the rule of capital.

Albert's association of "coordinatorism" with Marxism comes out of left field. Does Albert really believe that the economic aims of accountants, lawyers and mid-level corporate executives were best expressed by Karl Marx?

...His argument, as I understand it, is that the societies which have called themselves socialist and been ruled over by people who claim to be Marxist--countries like the former USSR, China, Cuba, North Korea, etc.--should be understood as "coordinatorist."

Here is his description of "this new economy": "It has public or state ownership of productive assets and corporate divisions of labor. It remunerates power and/or output. It utilizes central planning and/or markets for allocation. It is typically called by its advocates market socialism or centrally planned socialism...It has been adopted by every Marxist party that has ever redefined a society's economic relations."

This is by and large an accurate description of the countries listed above, past and present. But the question is whether they were socialist--and whether the "Marxist parties" that redefined their economic relations had anything to do with Marxism.

My organization, the International Socialist Organization, is part of a tradition that has always rejected the idea that these top-down regimes represent Marxism. Our case is simple--that the starting principle of Marxism was summed up in a sentence written by Marx for the rules of the First International: "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves." It doesn't matter what the rulers of the ex-USSR and the other so-called "socialist" countries called themselves--any more than it matters for our understanding of democracy that Bill Clinton calls himself a Democrat. The question is whether workers control society. In the USSR and the other bastions of "Marxism," the experience of workers wasn't one of control and freedom, but of exploitation, oppression and alienation from all levers of social and political control.

Albert claims that Marxist-Leninist theory has tendency towards concentrating power in the hands of "coordinators" even though that is not at all the intention. Specifically, they disagree about what happened in the early Soviet Union. Albert contends that democratic centralism was one factor that allowed "coordinators" such as Stalin come to power:

The problem isn't bad people. Yes, Stalin was no nice guy. But the problem was the institutions which select and elevate a thug like Stalin. The problem with Marxism Leninism isn't that everybody in those parties wants to trample workers on the road to ruling them. The problem is that those parties, and their core concepts, however well meaning many or even for most adherents may be, lead to that outcome. That's what I said before, and I say it here again. None of us, no one, is immune to the pressures of our circumstances, and on average concepts and organizational choices and strategies that have a built-in logic elevating coordinators are overwhelmingly likely to do just that: elevate coordinators.

Become a cop, even with the best motives the odds are you aren't going to serve the people, all the people, and some who take this route will become grotesque. Become a lawyer, even with the best motives the odds are that you aren't going to be a paragon of justice but an elitist coordinatorist person. Become a Leninist, with the very best of motives -- the very very best -- and the odds are you aren't going to make a revolution in our modern world, I think (for want of diverse focus and especially, ironically, true working class appeal), but if you do, the odds are your achievement will, even against your hopes, elevate coordinators to economic rule, not workers.

Maas's response to Albert's attacks:

Ultimately, Michael believes that the coordinator class can "wage a class war against capital," enlisting the support of workers to overthrow the system, but then "imposing their rule in the process and...dominating in the new society." We’ll leave aside for the moment whether this has ever happened. The question that I’d ask is: Why? Why go to the trouble of a revolution, when the instinct of members of the middle class--bred by their experience as managers who "command in the name of capital" and as a product of their whole world view--is to try to work their way up the ladder?

It’s one thing to discuss the role of the middle class or coordinator class under capitalism. But when you start imagining this class taking action to establish itself as the rulers over a new society, Michael’s case stops making sense, in my opinion. In fact, the only way it does make sense is to stop thinking of coordinators as doctors and lawyers and managers--that is, everyone that we’ve been talking about in the analysis of the coordinator class under capitalism--and understand them as a stalking horse for an argument against Marxism.

...

This is why--or at least the first few reasons why--the ISO has made the case for identifying the ex-USSR and its imitators in China, Cuba, etc., as "state capitalist" societies. Michael objects that that this argument is "far less useful than realizing that it must be, instead, if not capitalism, and if not an economy in which workers self manage--then something else." He quotes me comparing different aspects of the system in the ex-USSR and the West, but dismisses my case, because I apparently didn’t explain "the absence of that which for Marxists is usually the first thing mentioned about capitalism, that capitalists own the means of production."

...

if Michael is right, and Marxism’s "rhetorical entreaties" have, for the past 150 years, been a smokescreen for core principles that are fundamentally elitist, then an awful lot of people have been duped...

I’m open to a debate about what these leading Marxists have said and happy to point out--as I have at various points in this exchange--where I believe they were wrong. But in Michael’s "original sin" version of Marxism, they can’t possibly be right about their vision of a future socialist society ruled by the working-class majority. Whatever insights Marxists have had about capitalist society, as far as the future is concerned, there’s only rhetoric or principles that embody the interests of a middle class elite.

I don’t buy it. To me, there is neither an "elitist core" nor "fine-sounding rhetoric" in genuine Marxism--only a 150-year-old tradition that, though much developed over the years, can still be reduced to its commitment to a future society in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

The full debate is available both through Albert's site: http://zcommunications.org/znet/zdebatealbertvsmaass.htm

and through socialistworker.org:http://socialistworker.org/Featured/MarxDebate.shtml

Going through the book Ben lent on Marxism and religion "The Meek and the Militant" by Paul Siegel, I found one a description of underlying principles of Marxism out of which I think the tendency towards coordinatorism might develop. Siegel quotes George Novack, "The Marxist theory of knowledge accepted...the empirical contention that all the contents of knowledge are derived from sense experience." Jung claims that sense experience is only half of the equation, and that intuition is an equally valid process. Intuition gives us access to the unconscious contents of the mind, which are either innate contents or compensatory contents that form when the psyche becomes too one-sided. Intuition "presents itself whole and complete, without our being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence." A good example of intuition involving innate content would be people's fear of spiders and snakes. For compensatory content, intuition re-centers the psyche. An example of compensatory content is illustrated through Jung's claim "too much civilization makes the animal in us sick," so the compensatory content would be that moment of epiphany or realization of the need for balance in life.

I came across a good description of Jung's theory of the innate content of the mind recently:

"The collective unconscious, which forms the deepest stratum of each human life, also forms a foundation common to all mankind. It is said that the entire spiritual heritage of man, gathered over two million years, flows within this deepest stratum. One of Jung's followers, C. S. Hall, analyzed man's fear of snakes and darkness, and concluded that such fears could not be fully explained by the experiences of a single lifetime. Personal experiences only seem to strengthen and reaffirm the inborn fear. We have inherited a fear of snakes and darkness from ancestors back in the unknown past. This is, then, a hereditary fear, according to Hall, which proves that ancestral experience is an engrained memory living in the deepest stratum of human life."

Following this line of thinking, Marxist theory has a tendency to alienate people who favor the intuitive, compensatory way of thinking, in favor of those who insist the content of knowledge comes through sense experience. The intuitive, compensatory thinkers, being a minority, end up being out-voted under democratic-centralism. As their way of thinking disagrees with a basic assumption of Marxism, they feel ill-equipped to make their voices heard.

Monday, November 21, 2011

On Carl Jung and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

Our existence in society can be visualized as the middle ground between the opposing poles of existence as animal and existence through language.

Existence as animal ---------------> Existence in society <------------------ Existence through language

Historical materialism sees only one side of this formulation. It sees existence in society as necessarily developing out of how we produce enough subsistence to meet our animal needs.

Existence as animal ---------------> Existence through language ---------------> Existence in society

Why do I believe that our existence through language is fundamentally different from our needs for food, water, and shelter? Is not the development of language similar to, say, the evolutionary development of a tiger's sharp claws or a peacock's tail, in that they developed to enable the species to more effectively procure food or attract mates?

Yes, it is true we could view life through these lenses, seeing only the material causes for every event. But this view closes the door on so much! Unlike sharp claws or fancy tail feathers, language brought about the development of consciousness, and,in doing so, opened up a whole new way of looking at the world. Consciousness gives us the ability to “bind time,” as Korzybski put it, meaning that we can exist apart from the material world by reminiscing about past memories or planning future triumphs.

Rather than seeing history only as class struggle, history can also be seen as an attempt to unify the two opposing poles of our existence as animal and our existence as “time binders” through language.

Existence as animal, described by natural science ---------------> Existence in society <------------------ Existence as time binders through language, expressed by religious experience

If we are ever able to bring these two poles together, maybe we will be at what De Chardin calls the "sense of Earth."

De Charin wrote about: "The sense of Earth is the irresistible pressure which will come at the right moment to unite them (humankind) in a common passion." "Humanity. . . is building its composite brain beneath our eyes." - http://www.gaiamind.com/Teilhard.html

What interests me is the thought that Jung's archetypes are our clues for how to accomplish what De Chardin was talking about.

For Jung, archetypes are genetic echoes of how consciousness arose within early humans. These memories exist a priori in the structure of the human brain, waiting to be re-activated by specific social experiences.

What had to happen for consciousness to develop in early humans? I believe the development was gradual, with the archetypes signifying big events—the love of a mother, sharing in the knowledge of an elder, the fear of the unknown, the first conscious awareness of sexual attraction—I feel like these concepts existed as unconscious archetypes long before the creation of language.

Just as archetypes existed before we had words for them, perhaps archetypes can also be found on a social level.

Chardin wrote, "It is not our heads or our bodies which we must bring together, but our hearts." In looking to manufacture consciousness through artificial intelligence, we are getting too far ahead of ourselves. First we need to see how far human consciousness can reach, by creating a unity between our language-based and needs-based existences.